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Abstract
Despite more than a decade of heightened focus on
cybersecurity, the threat continues. To address
possible impacts, cyber threats must be addressed.
Mitigation catalogs exist in practice today, but these
do not map mitigations to the specific threats they
counter. Currently, mitigations are manually selected
by cybersecurity experts (CSE) who are in short
supply. To reduce labor and improve repeatability, an
automated approach is needed for matching
mitigations to cyber threats. This research explores the
application of supervised machine learning and text
retrieval techniques to automate matching of relevant
mitigations to cyber threats where both are expressed
as text, resulting in a novel method that combines two
techniques: support vector machine classification and
latent semantic analysis. In five test cases, the
approach demonstrates high recall for known relevant
mitigation documents, bolstering confidence that
potentially relevant mitigations will not be overlooked.
It automatically excludes 97% of non-relevant
mitigations, greatly reducing the CSE’s workload over
purely manual matching.

1. Introduction
Cyber systems are ubiquitous in all aspects of
society. Meanwhile, breaches to cyber systems
continue to be front-page news and, despite more than
a decade of heightened focus on cybersecurity, the
threat continues to evolve and grow. Symantec
reported that “Cyber attackers revealed new levels of
ambition in 2016, a year marked by extraordinary
attacks, including multi-million-dollar virtual bank
heists, overt attempts to disrupt the US electoral
process by state-sponsored groups, and some of the
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biggest distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on
record powered by a botnet of Internet of Things (IoT)
devices” [1]. Regrettably, subsequent years have not
been less exciting on the cybersecurity front. The years
2017 and 2018 saw a dramatic rise in ransomware
along with rapid adoption of cloud and Internet of
Things technologies for which mitigations 1 are still
immature [2].
To address possible impacts due to cyber threats,
information system (IS) stakeholders must first assess
the threats they face, then prioritize the risks. After
completing the risk assessment, stakeholders must
determine mitigations to counter the threats that pose
unacceptably high risk. A number of threat-informed
cyber risk assessment methodologies are described in
the literature and in use today (e.g. [3]–[5]). At the
other end of the cyber risk assessment spectrum,
numerous authors have tackled the problem of
mitigation optimization analysis; that is, taking a
longer list of possible mitigations then prioritizing or
down-selecting to a shorter list based on a set of
defined objectives (e.g. [6]–[9]).
Most cyber risk assessment methods stop short of
recommending mitigations. Meanwhile, optimization
approaches universally assume that a starting set of
possible mitigations exists on which to apply the
optimization techniques. Several mitigation catalogs
exist in practice today, including the Payment Card
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) [10],
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) technical controls [11], and NIST 800-53
Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Systems
[12]), but these do not map controls to the specific
threats they counter. Likewise, a variety of threat
frameworks exist in practice [13]. Of these, the
1

In this paper we use the term “mitigation” synonymously with
“countermeasure” and “security control” to mean a tool or technique
that may counter a cyber threat.
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Common
Attack
Pattern
Enumeration
and
Classification (CAPEC) [14], and Carnegie-Mellon
taxonomy of operational cyber security risks [15]
contain representative mappings of mitigations to
threats; however, there is currently no comprehensive
source of threat-mitigation mappings.
A method to produce this starting set, the initial
mapping of potential mitigations to cyber threats, is the
gap this research fills. Accordingly, this research aims
to devise an automated or semi-automated method for
matching mitigations to cyber threats expressed as
English language text documents using machine
learning and text retrieval techniques in support of
cyber risk assessment.
The primary contribution of this research to theory
is the artifact, a novel machine learning method for
matching mitigations to threats. From a practical
perspective, an automated approach to matching
mitigations to threats benefits all threat-informed cyber
risk assessment approaches by aiding decision-making
and reducing workload for CSEs whose job it is to
mitigate the identified cyber threats. Moreover, an
automated approach can support development and
maintenance of a knowledge base to make mitigation
selection more repeatable, facilitate knowledge reuse,
and extend the reach of cybersecurity experts. The
approach will be extensible to accommodate the
continued evolution of both cyber threats and
mitigations. The selection of mitigations applicable to
each threat can serve as inputs into analyses of
alternatives, both automated and manual, thereby
bridging the gap between cyber risk assessment and
final mitigation selection.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In the next section, we discuss related literature. Then
we discuss our research methodology, which is
grounded in the principles of the Design Science
Research Methodology (DSRM) [16]. Per the DSRM,
we identify objectives of a solution to our stated
research problem, then we discuss the design of the
solution artifact drawing from the knowledge base of
applicable research. We demonstrate use of the artifact
to solve a real-life problem, discuss the results, and
evaluate success. Finally, we discuss contributions and
limitations of the present research and propose future
work.

2. Literature review
During the literature review, we noted a lack of
existing published research dealing specifically with
automated matching of mitigation documents to cyber
threats. Absent this, our literature review instead
considers supportive analogous research. Casting our
problem as an information retrieval (IR) problem gives

rise to three veins of DSS research for investigation:
(1) using classification to judge whether each item in
the mitigation corpus should be included in or
excluded from a particular threat’s mitigation set, (2)
using a retrieval model such as commonly used in
search engines to enumerate mitigations ranked
according to their degree of relevance to the threat, and
(3) combinations of the two. We survey research for
these alternatives in the next three sections.

2.1. Classification
Classification is a supervised machine learning
technique in which a new item is assigned to its
appropriate category by a classifier, an algorithm or
model which has been trained to make such decisions
after learning from training data consisting of items
whose categories are already known. Classificationbased document selection has been researched
extensively in the context of medical systematic
reviews (SRs) underpinning evidence-based medicine
[17]–[24]. The process for SRs demands high recall to
ensure all relevant research is considered, but is less
stringent about precision, tolerating a few false
positives. The document selection process for updating
SRs bears stark similarities to the present research
problem in which we have a large corpus of
continually-evolving, highly technical cybersecurity
literature and we want to present the relevant
mitigation documents for a given threat while omitting
those that are extraneous. Moreover, like SRs, threatmitigation matching operates on an imbalanced corpus
of candidate mitigations where only a small percentage
are relevant to any particular threat. A key similarity
between selecting literature for an SR and selecting
mitigations for a threat may be the value judgment that
high recall is more important than high precision. We
elect to favor recall in the precision-recall tradeoff for
the same reason this choice was made in the case of
medical SRs and we assume that a few false positives
can be manually screened out if necessary.

2.2. Ranked retrieval
Commonly used in search engines, ranked retrieval
considers relevance between a query and a document
as a matter of degree. A retrieval model assigns a
relevance score to each query-document pair via a
ranking function. When ordered in descending
sequence by the relevance scores, those documents at
the top of the list are the documents deemed to be most
relevant to the query. Unfortunately, in order to make
binary relevant/non-relevant decisions using ranked
results, one must determine a cut-off point in the
ordered list. This is a challenging problem because, in
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general, the number of relevant results expected is not
known in advance [25].
The Vector Space model and Latent Semantic
Analysis (LSA) are similarity-based text retrieval
models. LSA-based text retrieval demonstrates
substantial improvement over keyword-based retrieval,
in part because it accommodates language intricacies
such as synonymy. Moreover, an LSA-transformed
matrix is considerably smaller than the corresponding
keyword-based term-document matrix, requiring only
50-150 factors compared with the hundreds or
thousands of words typical of a large document corpus
[26].
A few authors presented ranked retrieval research
analogous to our research problem. Swanson et al.
developed an automated method based on keyword
searching for linking complementary sets of articles in
the MEDLINE database [27]. Goldrich et al. applied
search engine technology, to match cybersecurity
requirements to descriptions of research projects in
order to highlight research aligned with the
requirements [28]. Foltz used LSA to filter a corpus
looking for new relevant documents based on an
existing profile of documents that had been previously
deemed relevant [29].

2.3. Hybrid approaches
A few authors have explored combinations of
classification and ranked retrieval techniques in text
mining. For example, Manning et al. [25] and
Nakamoto [30] discuss classification based on text
retrieval features, such as cosine similarity and
PageRank. Wiener et al. [31] utilized LSA for feature
reduction to identify topics using a neural network
classifier in a corpus consisting of more than 11,000
unique terms. Gee [32] described a method for
classifying email as spam or not-spam using an LSAinspired ensemble classifier implemented in three
stages.

3. Research methodology and objectives
Our research is framed within the Design Science
Research Methodology [16]. The DSRM is appropriate
for this research because we want to create an IT
artifact to solve a challenging problem for which a
solution will contribute to theory and practice. The
DSRM emphasizes design and evaluation rigor through
building upon existing research from the literature.
In the DSRM, defining the objectives of a solution
to the research problem at hand is an important
predecessor to artifact design because it previews the
desired end state. Objectives also provide the
foundation on which to build an evaluation strategy.

Our artifact will: (1) process existing English language
text documents where each separately describes either
a threat or a mitigation, (2) provide an automated
method for recommending relevant mitigations when
presented with a threat, (3) accommodate new and
evolving threats and mitigations, and (4) match a high
percentage of relevant mitigations for a given threat,
while avoiding selection of irrelevant mitigations.

3.1. Theoretical background of the artifact
Because knowledge about threats and mitigations is
largely expressed in unstructured or semi-structured
text documents, our idea is to cast the threat-mitigation
matching problem as an information retrieval problem,
using the threat as a query and the mitigation
documents as the corpus to be searched, and then build
upon applicable DSS research. Applying techniques
described in the literature we considered artifact
designs from three categories for the threat-mitigation
matcher: (1) classification drawing from medical SRs
research [17]–[24], (2) ranked retrieval drawing from
[27]–[29], and (3) hybrid approaches that combine
techniques from ranked retrieval in conjunction with
classification: drawing from [25], [30]–[32]. We
ultimately arrived at a hybrid approach described in
section 4.

3.2. Evaluation Approach
Evaluating the effectiveness of the artifact is a
hallmark of the DSRM. Moreover, the ability to
evaluate the effectiveness of a machine learning
approach is crucial to ensuring that the results are not
just a manifestation of chance. As we have cast our
research as an IR problem, we apply IR evaluation
methods to judge success. A full treatment of such
methods is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we
focus here on the methods we elected to use for
evaluation of our artifact. Precision and recall, defined
in Equations 1 and 2, are among the most common
measures of IR effectiveness. In contexts where the
objective is to correctly identify all positive instances,
recall is a primary evaluation metric [33]. Specificity is
the extent to which actual negative instances are
classified as such [34]. It is a measure used in fields
such as medicine and behavioral science to judge the
effectiveness of diagnostic tests. In contexts where the
objective is to rule out large swaths of negative
instances, such as in medical SRs and mitigation
selection, specificity can be an effective evaluation
measure. The false positive rate is the probability that a
non-relevant document will be retrieved. According to
Raghavan et al. the “usefulness of a retrieval system is
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determined to a great extent by how closely it can
characterize the dichotomy” of relevant vs nonrelevant documents for its intended purpose [35].
Eq. 2

Eq. 1

TP=retrieved/relevant; FP=retrieved/not relevant;
FN=relevant/not retrieved

4. The method
In this section, we discuss our method (artifact).
We introduce the data source, summarize the design
iterations which lead to the artifact, discuss the
machine learning techniques used, and explain the
rationale for the method ultimately selected. To arrive
at this method, we explored a number of designs,
including various classifiers, feature sets, and feature
reduction techniques. We used precision, recall, and
the rate of false positives to judge the merits of each
design. We emphasized recall (i.e. to present all
relevant mitigations) and tolerated a few false
positives.

starting with threat 49, password brute force guessing.
We also added a few additional mitigation documents
drawn from the Internet to bring the number of relevant
mitigation instances up to about 20 for each test threat.

4.2. Summary of designs considered
We had an intuition that the best approach for one
threat would also work for other threats. Figure 1
shows a summary of the precision, recall, and false
positive rates (cross-validation statistics) for five
designs for threat 49. The designations [C], [TR], and
[H] in the design names indicate the design concept:
classification, text retrieval, or hybrid. For the
classification and hybrid approaches, we show the
cross-validation statistics for both the relevant (R) and
non-relevant (NR) classes. For the text retrieval
designs, it is customary to evaluate based solely on
relevant results retrieved.

4.1. Data source
We used version 2.11 of the Common Attack
Pattern Enumeration and Classification [14] as the data
source for this research. CAPEC is an existing corpus
of descriptions of attack patterns (threats) expressed in
English language documents. Although mitigation
mapping is not the focus of CAPEC, some CAPEC
attack patterns include illustrative mitigations,
providing a convenient source of labeled data for our
research. CAPEC is a hierarchical representation of
attack patterns (i.e. threats), consisting of meta,
standard, and detailed patterns. For our purpose, we
focused on the standard patterns because their level of
specificity is similar to that of threats in cyber risk
assessments. There are approximately 125 standard
threats in CAPEC. There are approximately 600
mitigation texts in the corpus. The number of
mitigations mapped to each standard threat varies from
0 to about 10.
CAPEC has existed in the cybersecurity community
since at least 2007. We consider the CAPEC threatmitigation mappings to be ground truth. We recognize
that data quality is key to our results and we accept
CAPEC’s heritage as an indicator of sufficient quality
for this proof of concept research. By personal
inspection, we searched CAPEC for threats which had
at least a paragraph of descriptive text and about ten
relevant mitigations for use as labeled data. We
selected five threats and associated mitigations which
were suitable test cases for our experimentation,

Figure 1. Summary of Designs
For our classification designs, we initially tested
several classifiers before finally deciding on support
vector machines (SVM) for reasons discussed in
section 4.4. We experimented with two classification
strategies, one using the full text of the mitigations
(tokenized and represented via the Vector Space
Model) and the other using threat keywords/phrases
extracted with TextRank [36]. As shown in Figure 1,
the full text model had high precision (0.92), no false
positives, but unacceptably low recall (0.48) on the R
class. The keyword/phrase model had high precision
(0.97), no false positives, and improved recall (0.74)
on the R class. On the NR class, precision and recall
were very high (>0.99) for both but with high false
positive rates.
We investigated two ranked retrieval approaches
to matching, one based on the Vector Space Model and
the other based on LSA. LSA outperformed the Vector
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Space Model, retrieving 23 of 25 relevant items versus
15 of 25. To calculate precision and recall, we cut the
ranked list off at 25 entries and applied the formulas in
section 3.2. The main issue with this approach was lack
of a general strategy for implementing the R vs NR
cut-off point as discussed in section 2.2.
Finally, we experimented with a hybrid approach
that combined ranked retrieval and classification. This
design was ultimately the one we selected for our
artifact. We discuss it in greater detail in section 4.3.

4.3. Artifact design
Our artifact is designed to leverage SVM combined
with LSA. Model building is a three-step process as
illustrated in Figure 2. Note that a model is built for
each threat; thus, the mitigation documents input into
the indexing stage are labeled as R/NR to the specific
threat. For each mitigation text, we removed stop
words, then tokenized, lower-cased, and stemmed the
text. We computed a TF-IDF (term frequency-inverse
document frequency) representation of the corpus, then
transformed it to an LSA semantic space. The semantic
space and the R/NR labels were saved for reuse.

(SMOTE) [37], [38]. SMOTE creates new instances of
the minority class by drawing and combining features
from K nearest minority neighbors. We intuited that
our LSA-based balancing approach was better than
simply
undersampling
at
random
because
undersampling at random could drop relevant instances
of which we already have too few. We also posited that
ingesting the most similar entries during training, i.e.
keeping the relevant entries plus the non-relevant
entries that were most difficult to discriminate, aided
the classifier in finding a good decision boundary.
In the training stage, we built an SVM classifier
using the top 100 instances from the balancing stage
and saved the model for later use to predict the classes
of new unlabeled potential mitigations on a per-threat
basis. Using LSA afforded a feature reduction from
1,500 features in the plain text to 200 LSA topics. This
fits with optimal LSA dimensionality findings in
Bradford [39]. We selected the low end of Bradford’s
range because our corpus is much smaller than his.
Thus, the training data per document consisted of the
200 LSA topics augmented with the relevant or not
relevant labels. We saved the models.
Finally, we utilized the saved model in the
predicting stage to classify new potential mitigations
as relevant or not relevant to the threat associated with
the model. To do so, the new text was first transformed
to LSA features relative to the saved LSA space. Then
the saved threat-specific classifier was applied to label
the LSA-transformed mitigations. A demonstration and
evaluation of the method is discussed in section 5.

4.4. Design rationale

Figure 2. Artifact Design and Flow
In the balancing stage, we utilized LSA similarity
scores as a means to balance the training data. We
queried the mitigation LSA space using the full text of
the threat document (tokenized, stemmed, lower-cased,
and transformed to the semantic space) as the query.
Then, the top 100 mitigation entries based on similarity
to the threat text were retained. This balanced the data
for input into training by reducing the number of NR
instances.
During iterative design, we observed that the
corpus was highly imbalanced in favor of NR
instances. We initially experimented with methods to
improve the balance, such as random undersampling of
the NR class and oversampling of the R class with the
Synthetic
Minority
Oversampling
Technique

In the following paragraphs we provide insights
into why we selected particular elements in the design
of our artifact.
Why LSA? LSA has been shown to outperform
retrieval of relevant documents from a corpus [26]
when compared to keyword search because LSA
accounts for inherent complexities of natural language,
including the issue of synonymy, by evaluating the
entire corpus for word patterns. In our experiments, we
observed that LSA improved the matching of
mitigations to threats over keyword-based matching.
Why Classification? Two-class classification of
text documents has been successfully demonstrated in
the medical SRs literature as well as in our experiments
for
threat-mitigation
matching.
Moreover,
classification does not have the ambiguous cut-off
problem encountered in text retrieval.
Why SVM? SVM has been shown to perform
favorably for text classification, especially when the
number of positive instances per category is small [40]
and the feature set is large [41]. None of our
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experiments with other classifiers gave us reason to go
against these findings.
Why combine LSA and SVM? We used LSA in
combination with SVM in our artifact for three
reasons: (1) to balance the training data so as to reduce
the tendency of the NR class to dominate the model
(from >99.99% NR before balancing to about 75% NR
after), (2) as a feature reduction technique (from >1500
features before LSA to 200 features after), and (3)
because the LSA features are semantically richer,
accounting for synonymy.
We crafted this design for the above reasons and
selected it because of its high precision and recall and
low false positive rate on the R class based on crossvalidation statistics, excellent discrimination of the NR
class, and the ability to fully automate construction of
the “per threat” classifiers. The latter is a practical
consideration related to scalability; if we operationalize
this approach, we will have to build more than a few
classifiers and we prefer not to do so manually.
Building a classifier, i.e. the indexing, balancing, and
training stages illustrated in Figure 2, can be scripted to
run automatically per threat. The process for a single
classifier takes less than a minute and the process for
building many per-threat classifiers will scale linearly.

A comparison of the cross-validation statistics for
models trained on the unimproved and improved text is
shown in Figure 3 and discussed in section 5.3. In
general, models trained with the improved text
demonstrated better precision and recall in crossvalidation statistics than models trained on the
unimproved text.

5.2. Results for threat 49
We built an SVM classifier for threat 49 (and later
for 4 other threats), inputting the top 100 instances
(200 LSA-transformed features) from the balancing
stage and their relevant or not relevant labels into the
learning process. We saved the models for later use to
predict the classes of new unlabeled potential
mitigations. For threat 49, the model offered high
precision (0.96) and recall (0.92) with minimal
positives (1%) on the R class based on cross-validation
statistics. On the NR class, precision and recall were
very high (0.97 and 0.99 respectively) with an 8% false
positive rate.

5.3. Extensibility to Other Threats

5. Demonstration and evaluation of results
5.1. Analysis of the text
Success in classifying textual data is heavily
influenced by the characteristics of the text itself.
During design we used diagnostic tools to identify the
mitigations commonly misclassified for threat 49. We
investigated these false positives (FP) and false
negatives (FN) to better understand how they differed
from the correctly classified instances. One thing the
correctly classified instances had in common was that
they contained text explaining how the mitigation
addresses the threat. The false negatives lacked this
explanatory text. The false positives fell into two
categories: (1) some described password vulnerabilities
but not specifically password brute force guessing and
(2) others dealt with brute force guessing but not of
passwords.
We hypothesized that improving the mitigation
texts to include an explanation of how each one
addresses the threat would improve the match results
by reducing the FNs. Doing so also has practical
benefits, allowing the CSE to better understand the
reason a mitigation is relevant to the threat, to
determine its applicability in context, and to better
convey the rationale to the decision-makers who fund
mitigations.

Figure 3. Comparison for 5 Threats
Having seen promising cross-validation statistics
for threat 49 for the selected design, we wanted to
know if this outcome would extend to other threats.
We chose threats 66 (SQL injection), 134 (email
injection), 268 (audit log manipulation), and 593
(session hijacking) as additional test cases. We
compared cross-validation statistics for models trained
for the five test cases before and after the text
improvement discussed in section 5.1. Cross-validation
statistics for models built for the five test threats are
shown in Figure 3.
The left-most five sets of bars in Figure 3 show the
precision, recall, and false positive rates for models
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trained for the five test threats before and after the text
improvement. In the figure, “U” and “I” stand for
unimproved text and improved text, respectively. The
rightmost set of bars shows the mean precision, recall,
and false positive rate averaged across the five test
threats. At a glance, this figure shows that the crossvalidation measures are better after the text
improvement, except for threat 268. Because threat 268
had 1.0 precision before the text improvement,
precision declined slightly when recall went up after
the text improvement.
As illustrated in Figure 3, precision is between 0.86
and 1.0 and recall is between 0.86 and 0.95 for all five
test threats for improved text with false positive rate of
4% or less. Overall, although not a guarantee of
generality, these classifier cross-validation statistics are
favorable for the test threats and improved text.

6. Discussion
Demonstration and evaluation work together to
show that the artifact effectively solves the problem. In
the present research, we demonstrated and evaluated
the artifact by applying instantiations of it for five test
threats to predict the labels for new potential mitigation
documents that were held aside and not used during
training. The test data set consisted of 276 documents,
261 of which were extracted from the CAPEC
mitigations for threats other than 49, 66, 134, 266, and
593. The remaining 15 were drawn from the Internet 3 new relevant mitigations for each of the five test
threats. We discuss the evaluation of the artifact in the
next few paragraphs by revisiting the solution
objectives (Section 3). Quantitative machine learning
and IR performance metrics are shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Test Results – Improved Text
Objective: Process existing English language
text documents where each separately describes
either a threat or a mitigation. By testing, we

demonstrated that the method accepts English language
text documents, such as from CAPEC.
Objective: Provide an automated method for
recommending relevant mitigations when presented
with a threat. By testing, we demonstrated that the
method proposes matching mitigations for a threat.
Objective: Accommodate new and evolving
threats and mitigations. The method can accept new
mitigations which it will match to existing threats
using a stored model trained from labeled data. The
method can also accommodate new threats with the
caveat that adequate labeled data consisting of known
relevant mitigations for the threat would be needed so
that a threat-specific model can be trained.
Objective: Match most of the relevant
mitigations for a given threat while avoiding
selection of irrelevant mitigations. We experimented
with several artifact designs to see which attained the
best performance. Thus, we needed some objective
measures for comparison. During iterative design, we
used 10-fold cross-validation, comparing recall,
precision, and false positive rate to decide which
designs to advance or leave behind. Although suitable
for comparing models, cross-validation measures are
not definitive for new document instances.
During the evaluation stage, we re-evaluated the
classifiers on test data held aside and not used during
training as is customary in machine learning
evaluation. We computed the recall, precision, false
positive rate, and specificity by comparing the
predicted and actual labels for the test instances. As
Powers points out, focusing solely on precision and
recall tends to obscure a method’s prowess in correctly
identifying non-relevant instances [33]. This is
measured using specificity, and we think it is important
for threat-mitigation mapping because ruling out nonrelevant instances can lead to substantial workload
reduction for the CSE over purely manual matching.
Figure 4 shows the test results on the improved text
for five threats. Because the training measures yielded
precision and recall greater than 0.93 for the NR class,
this foreshadowed excellent discernment of the NR
class. Although we are most interested in the R class,
the model’s ability to discriminate NR instances is also
a benefit. Test results for precision and recall on the
NR class lived up to the promises made by the training
statistics. In addition, all five models had high
specificity (97-100%) on the NR class meaning at least
97% labor savings for the CSE in ruling out nonrelevant mitigations when compared to totally
manually matching efforts. With recall of the R class
registering 1.00 on test data for all five models, we can
be confident that the model will not overlook relevant
mitigations. This is desirable because we do not want
to obscure any relevant mitigations from the CSE.
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Precision is lower than we anticipated (between 0.27
and 0.75, mean 0.40) and with this comes a few (up to
3%) false positives. In our application, a false positive
means we will recommend a mitigation that does not
actually counter the threat resulting in a false sense of
security. In practice, this shortfall can be addressed by
providing CSE screening of the recommended matches
before they are made available for use in a knowledge
base.
In summary, excellent recall on the R class
combined with high precision (1.00), recall (>0.97),
and specificity (1.00) of the NR class means the
models will not overlook relevant mitigations and will
accurately eliminate 97% of the non-relevant
mitigations without manual intervention, greatly
reducing the CSE workload when compared to purely
manual matching while leaving just a few false
positives for the CSE to remediate.

7. Conclusions
Mitigation selection to remediate cyber threats has
heretofore been primarily a manual process done by
human experts using disparate textual sources.
Reliance solely on human experts brings issues of
scalability, consistency, and repeatability. The ongoing
shortage of cybersecurity experts combined with a
burgeoning cyber threat landscape compelled us to
look for a way to improve this situation.
In this research, we set out to devise a method for
matching mitigations to cyber threats expressed as
English language text documents using machine
learning and text retrieval techniques in support of
cyber risk assessment. We ultimately arrived at a
matching method that achieves the stated objectives
and we instantiated five examples as SVM “per threat”
classifiers based on LSA. We rigorously evaluated the
instantiations for our five test cases and were
encouraged by the results.
This research contributes to theory by taking steps
towards a novel machine learning method for
automatically mapping mitigations to threats, both
expressed as English language text, and by
demonstrating instantiations of the method. This
method fills a research gap in the cyber risk assessment
literature by providing a semi-automated method to
produce a starting list of possible mitigations to cyber
threats which can flow into mitigation optimization
techniques. It is extensible to accommodate the
continued evolution of both cyber threats and
mitigations, an important consideration in light of the
dynamic cyber landscape. We have also demonstrated
a way to improve the textual descriptions of threats and
mitigations to better support automated matching.

In practice, an automated approach to matching
mitigations to threats benefits all threat-informed cyber
risk assessment approaches by providing a means to
recommend relevant mitigations to remediate specific
threats thereby aiding decision-making for IS
stakeholders and CSEs. This is important because
under-mitigating the actual threats provides a false
sense of security, while over-mitigating is costly and
wasteful.
When operationalized into a knowledge base that
can save and reuse matches, this method may make
mitigation selection more repeatable, facilitate
knowledge reuse, reduce manual labor, and extend the
reach of CSEs. The list of mitigations applicable to
each threat can serve as input into analyses of
alternatives, both automated and manual, enabling
practitioners to leverage a large body of mitigation
optimization research. Finally, because this method can
respond to the evolutionary nature of cyber threats and
mitigations, while also reducing the time and effort
required for manual matching, it may improve overall
security of cyber systems when used as part of a risk
assessment and mitigation cycle by making more
frequent reassessments of cyber systems more feasible.

8. Limitations and future work
For this initial work, we bounded the scope,
providing ample opportunities for incremental
improvements. First, the artifact we developed is based
on English language documents. It would be
interesting to extend it to other languages. Also, we
made no effort to address redundant threats and
mitigations from our corpus. In order to ingest
documents from additional sources, the method should
be preceded by an automated approach for dealing with
duplication.
The method could be improved by exposure to
more threat and mitigation sources. In addition, further
analyses of the structure and semantics of threat and
mitigation documents from various sources could lead
to discovery of more ways to improve the document
content and by extension the matching method.
We only dealt with existing threats and
corresponding labeled mitigation data. This work could
be extended by investigating semi-supervised learning
classification techniques to build classifiers for new
threats where labeled data does not yet exist.
Moreover, it is possible that semi-supervised learning
could also be used to improve the classifiers initially
trained for existing threats by taking into account new
matches that come about as new mitigation documents
are added.
We focused our research on the defensive aspect of
cybersecurity, starting from the threat and identifying
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relevant mitigations. It is possible that our method may
be applicable or extensible to the “white hat” offensive
cybersecurity characterized by starting with a
mitigation and then considering threats against it, such
as to better understand attacker behavior or residual
exposure. While we established a degree of utility by
demonstrating that the artifact solves the problem for
five examples, survey research to investigate the
perceived utility by actual CSEs would be beneficial.
Finally, we identify several long-range goals.
Improving the ways that threat and mitigation texts are
written could make them more amenable to automated
matching, such as by devising standards for how to
rigorously express mitigations. For example, in section
5.1, we noted that improving the mitigation texts to
include an explanation of how each one addresses the
threat improved the match results by reducing the false
negatives. Furthermore, devising a robust structure
(e.g. [13], [42], [43]) to capture the intricacies of
threat/mitigation relationships would offer great
potential to improve the matches, helping to tease out
complexities such as overlapping threats and one to
many mitigation-threat mappings. This structure could
be used as metadata to improve the matching models.
In the long term, we envision the artifact as a
component of an overarching architecture with a
reusable,
continually
evolving,
peer-reviewed
knowledge base of threat-mitigation mappings with
contributions coming from many sources, including
threat frameworks, mitigation catalogs and vendor
literature.
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